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NOTE
Laudatory Terms in Trademark Law:
Square Pegs in Round Holes
Gary J. Sosinsky*
INTRODUCTION
American society just might have a fetish for being the best.
At any sporting event, one would be hard pressed to hear the chant
“We’re Number Two!” Leaders of companies often say they desire to make their company the best in their field.1 The Super
Bowl champion visits the White House after the season ends. The
runner-up simply goes home. Many American car companies
compare their cars to a Mercedes, the alleged top car company in
the world, or at least one car many consumers dream of having. At
high school graduations, the valedictorian speaks to the graduates,
their friends and family. As for the salutatorian, it’s a nice try and
a ceremony with her mouth shut. It is not a far stretch to say then,
that Americans try to associate themselves with “the best.”
American industry is all too conscious of this fact, and American
companies often coin their products with terms associated with being the best. This is where our trouble starts. Can one company
monopolize the right to label its product in a way that connotes it is
the finest product on the market?
Arguably, trademark law is woven into the fabric of our country’s economics. Companies such as McDonalds, Nike, Microsoft
and Intel are money-making machines. However, when these
* J.D. Candidate, 1999, Fordham University School of Law; Masters of Public and
Private Management, Yale University School of Management, 1996. I would like to
thank my family for a lifetime of love and support.
1. The odd exception to this is Avis Rent-A-Car, which makes a big deal as being
smaller and more hard-working than the industry leader, Hertz. Avis’s “We Try Harder”
slogan (whether true or not) has made its mark in the marketplace.
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companies were first established, no one could have predicted the
success that each of these entities would enjoy. Where once, each
of these company names meant very little, now these corporations
and their trademarks stand for something very special—a huge
corporate empire with the money and goodwill that go along with
it. The goal of trademark law is to protect the public, the companies that have created the trademark, and the associated goodwill
that goes hand in hand with the trademark.2 In addition, it has
been stated that trademarks render four functions deserving of
court protection:
(1) identifying one producer’s goods and distinguishing
them from the goods of others;
(2) signifying that all goods bearing the trademark come
from or are controlled by a single source;
(3) signifying that all products containing the mark are of
equal quality; and
(4) helping a producer in advertising and selling the goods.3
The companies mentioned above as well as much smaller businesses have utilized trademark law to make the purchasing public
aware of what is theirs and what is not. As was implied earlier,
trademarks, used properly, are statements of quality.4 By linking
their products to a certain level of quality, companies position their

2. S. REP. NO. 1333 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274 (cited in DONALD
A. GREGORY, ET. AL., INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 84-85 (1994) (citation omitted)). When the Senate Committee reported out the bill that was to become
the Federal Trademark Act of 1946 (the Lanham Act), it noted that trademark law had
two purposes:
One is to protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product
bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the product
which it asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trade-mark
has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is
protected in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats.
This is the well-established rule of law protecting both the public and the trademark owner.
Id.
3. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 3:2 (4th ed. 1996).
4. See JOHN D. OATHOUT, TRADEMARKS 34 (1981).
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products and stimulate sales, boosting the economy.
Both the public and producers of goods benefit from trademark
law. The public benefits because its “search costs” are lessened
and the companies benefit because each one knows that if a particular consumer wishes to purchase its good or service, the consumer will not have to sift through different products that are very
similarly named in order to find the one that he or she is looking
for.5 The company earns income that helps its bottom line and the
consumer spends her hard-earned money on a product or service
that should satisfy her needs.
Though registration of a trademark is not necessary to protect a
mark from others using it as their own, it is recommended to do
so.6 Trademark rights live forever as long as the holder of the
mark neither abandons the mark nor permits it to lose its trademark
significance by becoming a generic term.7 When protection lasts

5. Customers look for specific brands because of the qualities associated with that
brand. See id.; see also Union Nat’ Bank of Texas, Laredo, Texas, v. Union Nat’ Bank of
Texas, Austin, Texas, 909 F.2d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 1990) (explaining the value of trademarks in reducing consumer search costs); William Landes & Richard Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268-70 (1987) (discussing
the economic benefits of a brand name).
6. It is recommended to establish your rights by applying to register the mark in the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office even before use. See Kenneth B. Germain, Scratching
the Surface of Trademark Law, C602 ALI-ABA 6 (1991). A company can base its application to register a mark on one of a few premises: (a) a bona fide intention to use the
mark in federally regulated commerce (the mark then must be used in the ordinary course
of business); (b) a foreign owner’s country of origin application filed during the previous
six months, or its country of origin registration, in either case with a statement of a bona
fide intention to use the mark in the course of business; or (c) actual use of the mark in
commerce. See id.; see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 1051 (West 1998).
7. See generally Silverman v. CBS Inc. 870 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1989), cert denied, 492
U.S. 907 (1989) (for a discussion of abandonment of trademarks); see also Star-Kist
Foods, Inc. v. P.J. Rhoades & Co., 769 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that a trademark was not abandoned when the owner of the mark ceased using the mark for a period
of unprofitability but intended to use the mark again when the economics were more favorable). For a discussion of generic terms, see generally DuPont Cellophane Co. v.
Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1936) (holding that whether a trademark has been
abandoned includes whether the mark has been voluntarily surrendered to the public); see
also King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Industries, Inc. 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963)
(holding that the term THERMOS was generic and not entitled to federal trademark protection when the great majority of the American public referred to any vacuum-insulated
container as a thermos).
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forever, it is not difficult to see why coining a “proper” trademark
is important to any business.
In 1997, Estee Lauder brought an action against the Gap,
claiming that the Gap’s use of the term “100%” on its body lotion
packaging would cause consumers confusion because the term
“100%” was similar to Estee Lauder’s use of the term “100%” on
its body lotion packaging.8 The Second Circuit held that the term
“100%” was “suggestive” and worthy of protection as long as consumers would be confused by the two different brands, a finding
that Estee Lauder could not prove.9 The most interesting part of
the case was the court’s discussion of whether or not the term
“100%” could be protected as a trademark.10 The issue was
whether “100%” was deemed “suggestive” or “descriptive.” If
suggestive, the term could be protected, but if descriptive, the term
could not be protected absent a showing of secondary meaning.11
The court stated the term “100%” was a laudatory one, such as
“Best,” “Plus,” or “Super” in that it appears to praise any product it
is associated with, just as “Best” would do the same.12 The Estee
Lauder case demonstrated that coping with the protection of laudatory terms is a challenging task.
Generally, it has been held that laudatory terms are descriptive
and therefore not protected without a showing of secondary meaning.13 Therefore, the Estee Lauder case, by holding “100%” suggestive, re-kindled an old dilemma in trademark law. Whether a
term is labeled suggestive or descriptive is critical for the company
trying to register or protect the term because showing that a term
has secondary meaning, as is necessary for descriptive terms, is a
difficult burden.14 For laudatory terms, there appears no easy answer.
This Note argues that laudatory terms have been mislabeled as

8. See Estee Lauder Inc. v. The Gap, Inc., 108 F.3d 1503 (2d Cir. 1997).
9. See id. at 1512.
10. See id. at 1509-10.
11. See id.; see also supra Part I.
12. See 108 F.3d at 1509.
13. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 11:17. (stating the prevailing view).
14. See, e.g., Murphy v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 923, 927-28 (2d Cir.
1991) (discussing that there is no specific formula for determining secondary meaning).
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descriptive for many years, when in fact they are actually more
akin to suggestive terms. These laudatory terms however, should
not be given the protection afforded suggestive terms; secondary
meaning should be required if the laudatory term is to be monopolized by the user. Part I outlines trademark law and the various
levels of protection for a mark. Part II, in chronological order,
analyzes various cases that discuss the issue of laudatory terms,
and shows the inconsistencies in courts’ handling of these cases.
Part III argues that laudatory terms should be analyzed uniformly
by courts—as being suggestive in a literal sense yet needing secondary meaning to be protected. Accordingly, this Note concludes
that laudatory terms do not fit nicely into the current trademark
framework and it is this uncertainty that has led the judicial system
astray.
I. TRADEMARK LAW
In order to understand the laudatory term analysis, it is necessary to start at the beginning and take a brief look at the history and
the purposes of trademark law. This Part analyzes the trademark
spectrum of possible marks. With this background, an analysis of
laudatory terms and the potential problems they pose will be possible.
A. History of Trademark Law
For thousands of years, civilization has used symbols to identify ownership and origin of goods and wares.15 It might be that
the earliest kind of marking was that of branding cattle and other
animals.16 We derive the English word “brand” from the AngloSaxon word “to-burn”.17 Quarry marks and stonecutters’ signs
have been found in Egyptian structures erected as early as 4000
B.C.18 In the ruins at Pompeii, Roman signboards were located.19
In medieval England, sword manufacturers were required to use

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 5:1.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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identifying marks so that defective weapons could be traced back
to the unfortunate seller.20
Compared to Anglo-American property law, trademark law is
very new.21 There are only a handful of trademark cases found in
seventeenth and eighteenth century England.22 Sometime in the
early seventeenth century, a cloth-maker was held to have a cause
of action against a competitor who had copied the plaintiff’s mark
and placed it on his lesser quality merchandise.23 In the very early
nineteenth century, English and American common law gradually
developed the doctrine of “passing off” or “palming off.”24
Federal trademark law traces its beginnings to 1870, when the
United States Congress passed the Act of July 8, 1870.25 This statute was struck down by the Supreme Court less than a decade
later.26 Congress went back to the drawing board and when Congress finished drawing, it had codified the common law and created the Trademark Act of 1946, commonly referred to as the Lanham Act (“Lanham Act” or “Act”).27 The Lanham Act has
survived the test of time because it has adopted to the outside
forces of the marketplace when necessary.28
20. See id.
21. See id. § 5:2.
22. See id.
23. See id. (citing Southern v. How, 79 Eng. Rep. 1243 (1618)).
24. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 5:2.
25. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198. See Tara J. Goldsmith, What’s
Wrong with this Picture? When the Lanham Act Clashes with Artistic Expression, 7
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 821, 826 (1996); OATHOUT, supra note 4, at
6.
26. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 86 (1879) (finding the 1870 Act unconstitutional because Congress used the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution to
justify its regulation of trademarks, but stating that the Commerce Clause could be relied
on); Goldsmith, supra note 25, at 826.
27. Trademark Act of 1946 (“Lanham Act”) ch 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C.A §§ 1051-1127 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999)).
28. See generally Ethan Horwitz & Benjamin Levi, Fifty Years of the Lanham Act:
A Retrospective of Section 43(a), 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 59 (1996)
(providing a historical accounting of the Lanham Act); Joseph D. Garon, The Lanham
Act: A Living Thing, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 55 (1997) (discussing
the evolution of the Lanham Act). In the beginning, the only function of a trademark was
to designate the source of a product, whereas with the growth of industry in the United
States and around the world, the function has broadened to include, “in addition to identification of origin, both a guarantee of quality for the purchaser and a source of advertis-
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From the beginning, the Lanham Act has been a triumph for
the businesses of America.29 The Act is based on the firm principle
that when a business has spent time and money to develop an identification for its product, it is not equitable to allow another business that has not spent the resources, to use the unique mark and
cash in on the goodwill of the party that has made the critical investment.30 Therefore, a trademark owner has the right to stop
others from infringing on his mark when a likelihood of confusion
will arise among consumers.31 This is so even if the goods purchased through deception are of equal or higher quality than those

ing for the manufacturer.” Id. at 56 n.8 (citing 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 3.04[1], 3.05 (3d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1996)).
29. See Garon, supra note 28, at 55.
30. It has been stated that “[t]he Lanham Act is the embodiment of the purpose to
secure to every businessman the advantage which public preference for his goods gives to
him and to protect him in the exclusive right to the names and marks which perpetuate
the good will which merit earns.” Garon, supra note 28, at 55-56 (quoting Edward S.
Rogers, Introduction, in DAPHNE ROBERT, THE NEW TRADE-MARK MANUAL, A
HANDBOOK ON PROTECTION OF TRADE-MARKS IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE (1947)); see
also Goldsmith, supra note 25, at 829 (citing Frisch’s Restaurant v. Shoney’s Inc., 759
F.2d 1261, 1264 (6th Cir. 1985)); The Sports Auth., Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 89
F.3d 955, 963 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that the court considers the defendant’s intent in
adopting his mark).
31. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114 (West 1998). Section 114 states:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection
with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate a registered mark and
apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation to labels,
signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended
to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for
sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection
with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive, shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies
hereinafter provided. Under subsection (b) hereof, the registrant shall not
be entitled to recover profits or damages unless the acts have been committed with knowledge that such imitation is intended to be used to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.
Id.; see, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elec. Corp. 287 F.2d 492 (2d. Cir. 1961) (applying the Polaroid factors), cert denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1969); Sports Authority 89 F.3d at
955.
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that were meant to be purchased.32 Hence, it is confusion and the
similarity of marks that is the thrust of the Lanham Act.33
Knowing this, the process of developing and protecting trademarks is complex.34 Developing a branded product requires a
great deal of long-term investing in advertising, promotion and
strategy.35 A brand is “a seller’s promise to consistently deliver a
specific set of features, benefits, and services to the buyers.”36 In
addition, “a brand first brings to mind certain attributes.”37 For instance, Mercedes suggests durable, well engineered, fast and high
prestige automobiles.38 A potent brand is said to have high brand
equity.39 Furthermore, it is this high level of brand equity that all
businesses wish their products to possess.40 Simply, brand equity
starts with a name.41 Because advertising budgets are normally at
a fixed amount and every company wants more bang for its buck,
companies favor names—trademarks and brands, that sell themselves.42 This is where marketers get themselves in trouble. It is
important to have the right trademark for selling purposes, but it is
equally important to have a mark that will be protected by the Act
should others use the same or a very similar mark. Stripped to its
essence, the law is clear that to succeed in a Lanham Act suit for

32. See Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1216 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976) (finding a Lanham Act violation even though
plaintiff’s and defendant’s goods were ‘of equal quality’).
33. See Goldsmith, supra note 25, at 829-30; see also Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12
F.3d 632, 643 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[o]thers can produce designs similar to the trademark so
long as there is no likelihood of consumer confusion”); 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, §
23:1.
34. See, e.g., John D. Danforth, Effective Management of an International Trademark Portfolio, 455 PLI/PAT. 435, 437 (1996) (providing a methodology for the development and protection of a trademark); see also PHILIP KOTLER, MARKETING
MANAGEMENT 444 (8th ed. 1994) (discussing brands and brand management).
35. See KOTLER, supra note 35, at 444.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 445.
40. KOTLER, supra note 35, at 445.
41. See id. at 445 (“brand equity is higher, the higher the brand loyalty, name
awareness, perceived quality, strong brand associations, and other assets such as patents,
trademarks, and channel relationships”).
42. See Danforth, supra note 34, at 438.
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trademark infringement, a plaintiff has two obstacles to surpass:
(1) the plaintiff must prove that its mark is entitled to protection
and, just as important, (2) that the defendant’s use of its own mark
will likely cause confusion with plaintiff’s mark.43 Whether or not
a mark is protected is clearly important to the success of the products the mark is associated with.
B. Trademark Spectrum
The Lanham Act broadly defines the term trademark. Trademarks are any word, symbol or device used in commerce to identify and distinguish goods.44
“The strength of a trademark in the marketplace and the degree
of protection it is entitled to are categorized by the degree of the
mark’s distinctiveness in the following ascending order: generic,
descriptive, suggestive, and arbitrary or fanciful.”45 “A generic
term is a common name, like automobile or aspirin, that describes
a kind of product”46 and does not identify the source of the product.47 The actual name of a product cannot be used as someone’s
trademark because that would leave others without the critical term

43. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1)(a); see also Sports Auth. Inc. v. Prime Hospitality v.
Prime Hospitality Corp. 89 F.3d 995, 960 (2d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted); Gruner + Jahr
USA Pub. v. Meredith Corp. 991 F.2d 1072, 1075 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that
PARENT’S DIGEST was not likely to cause a sufficient number of ordinary prudent
purchasers to be confused with PARENTS magazine).
44. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127. A Trademark is:
[A]ny word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof—(1) used by
a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce
and applies to register on the principal register established by this Chapter, to
identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods,
even if that source is unknown.
Id.
45. Gruner + Jahr, 991 F.2d at 1075; see also Estee Lauder Inc. v. The Gap, Inc.,
108 F.3d 1503, 1508 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing the classifications for trademarks); 20th
Century Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust Inc., 747 F.2d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1984), cert denied,
470 U.S. 1052 (1985); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9
(2d Cir. 1976) (discussing the spectrum of trademark protection); GREGORY, supra note
2, at 86-90.
46. Gruner + Jahr, 991 F.2d at 1075.
47. See GREGORY, supra note 2, at 89-90; Gruner + Jahr, 991 F. 2d at 1075.
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to advertise or publicize its own product.48 Therefore, a common
generic name is never entitled to trademark protection.49 The Act
dictates cancellation of a registered mark if at any time it “becomes
the common descriptive name of an article or substance.”50 Names
such as “YO-YO,”51 “ASPIRIN,”52 “CELLOPHANE,”53
“MULTISTATE BAR EXAMINATION,”54 “THERMOS,”55
“SHUTTLE,”56 “TOLL HOUSE,”57 “OPRY”58 and “LITE”59 are
in this generic category. At the opposite end of the distinctiveness
spectrum is an arbitrary or fanciful term.60 This type of term may
always claim trademark protection, “is never a common name for a
48. See SIEGRUN D. KANE, TRADEMARK LAW 15 (2d ed. 1991).
49. See DORIS E. LONG, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND THE LANHAM ACT, 44 (1993) (citation omitted); see also Gruner + Jahr, 991 F. 2d at 1075 (stating that a common name
can never obtain trademark protection); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods Co., 85
F.2d 75, at 80-81 (2d Cir. 1936); King-Seeley Thermos v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d
577, 579-81 (2d Cir. 1963) (discussing thermos as a generic term); see also GREGORY,
supra note 2, at 89-90 (discussing marks that are incapable of trademark protection).
50. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1064(c)(West 1998).
51. See Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co., 343 F.2d 655 (7th Cir.
1965) (an action for the alleged infringement of Yo-Yo’s trademark).
52. See Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co. 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (holding that the
“aspirin” mark had entered the public domain).
53. See DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 76-77 (2d Cir.
1936) (holding that DuPont’s advertising had used cellophane as a generic term, descriptive of the product, not of its source).
54. See National Conference of Bar Examiners v. Multistate Legal Studies, Inc., 692
F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that the phrase “MBE” had a common descriptive quality).
55. See King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.
1963) (holding that “thermos” is a generic term).
56. See Eastern Air Lines v. New York Air Lines, 559 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (holding that “air-shuttle” is a generic term).
57. See Nestle Co. v. Chester’s Mkt., Inc., 571 F. Supp. 763 (D. Conn. 1983), remanded and vacated on other grounds, 756 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1985) (TOLL HOUSE for
cookies found to be generic despite more than $1 billion in sales over a ten year period
and $140 million in advertising).
58. See WSM, Inc. v. Hilton, 724 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) (OPRY found to be generic despite use for over fifty years).
59. See Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 655 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1981)
(LITE held to be generic for low-alcohol beer despite very high sales and advertising levels).
60. See Gruner + Jahr Publ’g v. Meridith Corp., 991 F.2d 1072, 1075 (2d Cir.
1993); see also GREGORY, supra note 2, at 86-87 (stating that a fanciful mark is the most
distinctive); Danforth, supra note 34, at 438 (discussing the spectrum of trademark protection).
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product, and bears little or no relationship to the kind of product
represented.”61 An arbitrary term has a dictionary meaning but
does not describe the product at hand.62 An example would be
Ivory for soap.63 A fanciful mark is a name that is made-up to
identify the trademark owner’s product—such as EXXON for oil
products and KODAK for photographic services.64 The categories
described above are easy for a court to deal with. The other categories are not as simple for the judiciary.65
The other two categories determining a trademark’s strength
are “suggestive” and “descriptive.”66 A suggestive mark is an inherently distinctive mark, just as an arbitrary or fanciful one is.67
The category of suggestive marks arose because the judicial system needed to protect marks the common law did not—any mark
that was not fanciful or arbitrary.68 There also existed a need to
give protection to marks that were neither exactly descriptive on
the one hand nor truly fanciful on the other—a need that was particularly keen because of the bar in the Trademark Act of 190569
on the registration of merely descriptive marks regardless of proof
of secondary meaning.70 Since creating the category, the courts
have had a difficult time defining it.71 Judge Learned Hand has
made the unhelpful statement: “[i]t is quite impossible to get any
rule out of the cases beyond this . . [t]hat the validity of the mark

61. See Gruner + Jahr, 991 F.2d at 1075-76.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id.; see also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ 11:2-11:4A; Danforth, supra
note 34, at 438.
65. See, e.g., Franklin Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Fashionit Sweater Mills, Inc., 297 F.
247, 248 (2d Cir. 1923), aff’d per curiam, 4 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1925) (discussing where a
mark falls on the spectrum, the court stated, “[i]t is impossible to get any rule out of the
cases beyond this.”)
66. See Gruner + Jahr, 991 F.2d at 1076; see also GREGORY, supra note 2, at 87-88
(discussing non-inherently distinctive marks).
67. See GREGORY, supra note 2, at 87; Gruner + Jahr, 991 F.2d at 1076; see also
Abercrombie, 537 F.2d 4, 10-11 (2d Cir. 1975).
68. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 11:63.
69. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724.
70. See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 10; Orange Crush Co. v. California Crushed Fruit
Co., 297 F. 892 (App. D.C. 1924); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 11:63.
71. See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 10.
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ends where suggestion ends and description begins.”72 If one took
a survey of all the trademarks existing today, one would find that
the majority of those marks would be suggestive of the product.73
“A term is suggestive if it requires imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of the goods.”74 It
has also been said that a suggestive term “suggests, rather than describes, some characteristic of the goods to which it is applied and
requires the consumer to exercise his imagination to reach a conclusion as to the nature of the goods.”75 Examples of suggestive
marks include CHARRED KEG for whiskey,76 GUNG HO for
toys,77 and ORANGE CRUSH for an orange-flavored beverage.78
Descriptive marks “describe or identify an ingredient, quality,
characteristic, function feature, purpose, or use of the goods or services to which the mark is applied.”79 Courts have utilized a couple
of tests to determine if a mark is descriptive.80 First, the “dictionary definition test” looks to the dictionary definition of the term in
question to see if that definition “includes or suggests a direct rela-

72. Franklin Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Fashionit Sweater Mills, Inc., 297 F. 247, 248
(2d Cir. 1923), aff’d per curiam, 4 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1925); see Abercrombie, 537 F.2d
at 10. See also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 11:66 (“The descriptive category almost
imperceptibly shades over at its fringe into the suggestive domain”); Union Carbide
Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc. 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830
(1976):
[I]t is often a difficult distinction to draw and is, undoubtedly, often made on an
intuitive basis rather than as the result of a logical analysis susceptible of articulation. This only emphasizes the need to give due respect to the determinations of the Patent Office if the distinction is to be drawn in a consistent manner.
Id. at 379.
73. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 11:65.
74. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 11; Stix Prods, Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs Inc.,
295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); see generally General Shoe Corp. v. Rosen, 111
F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir. 1940) (examining a suggestive term).
75. LONG, supra note 49, at 49 (quoting Vision Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111,
115-16 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1016 (1980)).
76. See In re Majestic Distilling Co., 420 F.2d 1086, 1088 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
77. See Hasbro Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1988).
78. See Orange Crush Co. v. California Crushed Fruit Co., 54 App. D.C. 313
(1924).
79. GREGORY, supra note 2, at 88.
80. See LONG, supra note 49, at 47.
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tionship with the products or services in question”.81 Another test
is the “imagination test”, a test that weighs the link between the actual words of the mark and the product that they are connected to.82
“If the term standing alone conveys information as to characteristics of the goods, it is descriptive.”83 A third test considers if competitors would need the term to describe their products.84 Descriptive marks are not protected as marks unless they have acquired
secondary meaning.85 Secondary meaning has been described by
one court as the situation where most consumers have come to
think of the word not as descriptive but as the name of the product.86 Descriptive marks are not given exclusive protection with81. Id. at 48; see also Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786,
792 (5th Cir. 1983)(applying dictionary definition test).
82. LONG, supra note 50, at 48; see also Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse,
Inc., 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying this test).
83. LONG, supra note 50, at 48.
84. See id.; see also Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc. 531 F.2d 366, 379
(7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830.
85. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1052, which states:
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from
the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its nature unless it—
...
(e) Consists of a mark which—
(1) when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is
merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them;
...
(f) Except . . . nothing herein shall prevent the registration of a mark used by
the applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce.
Id. Gruner + Jahr Publ’g v. Meredith Corp., 991 F.2d 1070, 1076 (2d Cir. 1973); see also
Valmor Prods. Co. v. Standard Prods. Corp. 464 F.2d 200, 202 (1st Cir. 1972) (finding
that plaintiff’s use of a mark, VALMOR, on its products and in its advertising over 45
years had established a close connection between the trademark name and its products);
In Re Wileswood, Inc. 201 U.S.P.Q. 400, 404 (P.T.O.-T.T.A.B. 1978) (holding the laudatory, descriptive term AMERICA’S FINEST not registrable because it had not acquired
secondary meaning with regard to popcorn).
Id.
86. See Int’l Kennel Club of Chicago, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc. 846 F.2d 1079 (7th
Cir. 1988) (quoting Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. SOS Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 609 (7th Cir.
1986)); see also Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 348 (7th Cir. 1987)
(stating that “secondary meaning denotes an association in the mind of the consumer between the trade dress [or name] of a product and a particular producer.”); Centaur Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1221 (2d Cir. 1987) (a
“mark comes to identify not only the goods but the source of those goods, even though
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out secondary meaning for two reasons. First, a descriptive term
that solely informs the consumer of a particular quality of the
product does not automatically function to identify and distinguish
any particular seller’s product.87 As well, because a trademark
serves to perform this very function, a descriptive mark is not capable of exclusive trademark protection without a showing of procured distinctiveness.88 Second, descriptive terms should be available to all companies to describe their products.89 The Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals stated that trademark law does not
protect descriptive marks because it is necessary “to maintain freedom of the public to use the language involved.”90 Marks that
have been found to be descriptive include “VISION CENTER,”91
“EVERREADY,”92 “HOME SAVINGS,”93 and “SHEAR
PLEASURE.”94
As one may expect, it takes lots of time and money to have
one’s goods acquire secondary meaning.95 Therefore, the fine line
between suggestive and descriptive marks is a critical one indeed.96
The former has trademark protection from birth while the latter has
protection only after a showing that consumers link the name and
the source of the product.97 Therefore, the question of where
laudatory terms fall on the distinctiveness spectrum, suggestive—
protected as inherently distinctive, or descriptive—protected only
if secondary meaning has attached, will determine how well they
the relevant consuming public might not know the name of the producer”).
87. See GREGORY, supra note 2, at 88.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. In Re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 813, (C.C.P.A. 1978).
91. See Vision Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444
U.S. 1016 (1980) (for a place to purchase eyeglasses).
92. See Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976) (for batteries and light bulbs).
93. See Home Sav. of Am. v. Home Sav. Ass’n., 219 USPQ 157 (S.D. Tex. 1982)
(for savings and loan services).
94. See Pullan v. Fulgright, 227 U.S.P.Q. 493 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985) (for hairdresser/beauty shops).
95. See LONG, supra note 49, at 68-69.
96. See, e.g., In re Occidental Petroleum Corporation, 167 U.S.P.Q. 128 (T.T.A.B.
1970); Estee Lauder Inc. v. The Gap, Inc., 108 F.3d 1503 (2d Cir. 1997).
97. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10 (2d Cir.
1976); In Re Wileswood Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. at 404.
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stand up to a challenge from a competitor’s term.98
II. ANALYSIS OF LAUDATORY TERMS
This section will delve into the heart of the matter—laudatory
terms. First, a very brief look at the leading trademark treatise’s
opinion on laudatory terms will be discussed. Next, through an
analysis of case law on the issue, the concept of laudatory terms
and their usage should become clearer. This section will look at
the usage of laudatory terms spanning over one hundred years.
The forthcoming cases deal with such products as beer, facial
products, mortgage services and much more.
“Laudatory” can be defined as “containing or expressing
praise”.99 Professor McCarthy states: “marks that are merely
‘laudatory’ and descriptive of the alleged merit of a product are
also regarded as being ‘descriptive’.”100 In addition, it has been
stated that “[m]erely laudatory terms are also considered to be descriptive.” 101 However, it has very recently been stated that laudatory marks contain an expression about the quality of the product
and can be either suggestive or descriptive, depending on the mark
and the situation.102
The concept of using laudatory terms as marks goes back as far
as the Nineteenth century.103 It is well known that beer is taken seriously in America and a couple of early cases stress this point.104
In Beadleston & Woerz v. Cooke Brewing Co.,105 Beadleston filed
for an injunction to restrain Cooke from using the term “Imperial”
because “Imperial” was claimed to be a trademark of Beadleston.106 Beadleston used as its trademark the coat of arms of the
state of New York alongside “Beadleston & Woerz”, the words
98. See, e.g., Estee Lauder Inc. v. The Gap, Inc., 108 F.3d 1503 (2d Cir. 1997).
99. THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 758 (1984).
100. 2 MCCARTHY supra note 3, § 11:17.
101. Danforth, supra note 34, at 438.
102. See Baila H. Celedonia, Review of the Basic Principles of Trademark Law, 559
PLI/LIT 147, 157 (1997).
103. See, e.g., Beadleston & Woerz v. Cooke Brewing Co., 74 F. 229 (7th Cir.
1896).
104. See id.; Pabst Brewing v. Decatur Brewing Co., 284 F. 110 (7th Cir. 1922).
105. 74 F. 229 (7th Cir. 1896).
106. See id. at 230.
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“Empire Brewery” and the name of the beer to which the trademark was attached.107 The label of Cooke’s beer read “Cooke’s
Imperial Beer”—these words alongside a shield of stars and stripes
with the monogram ‘C’.108 The Seventh Circuit stated that there
was no “palming off” the goods of another because the labels were
dissimilar, each company’s beer was sold in different geographic
markets, and Cooke used “Imperial” in good faith.109 Furthermore,
the Seventh Circuit explained that a trademark must be designed to
indicate the producer of a commodity and to separate that particular product from the wares of others.110 Moreover, the court stated
that the mark cannot be held to be valid if it is used to identify the
class, grade, style, or utility of the article.111 In holding that the
plaintiff’s goodwill was not diluted, the court stated that “Imperial”
was used to describe the quality of the beer whereas the rest of the
distinctive package identified the source of the beer.112 The court
concluded that “[t]he monopoly of use granted by the law of
trademarks should not be extended to embrace terms of doubtful
signification”.113
In Pabst Brewing v. Decatur Brewing Co., 114 the term “Blue
Ribbon” had been registered and used by the plaintiff on a certain
make of its beer and had acquired secondary meaning due to the
large number of sales of this brand of beer.115 The defendant, at a
later date, put out a malt extract under the name of “Blue Ribbon”,
registered it as its trademark for malt extract, and sold a very large
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 230-31.
110. See id. at 231.
111. See id.
112. See id. The court noted that various dictionaries defined “Imperial” in a very
standard way—”of superior size or quality.” Id. at 232. The record in this case was filled
with examples of “Imperial” being used for general quality - “Imperial Champagne,”
“Imperial Whisky,” “Imperial Gin,” “Imperial Cigars,” “Imperial Ginger Ale,” “Imperial
Cider” and Imperial Port.” Id.
113. Id. at 233. See also McGraw Tire & Rubber Co. v. Griffith, 198 F. 566
(S.D.N.Y. 1911) (holding there was unfair competition and an infringement of the trademark “Imperial” when the defendant tire company bought “Imperial” tires from the plaintiff, subsequently incorporated under the name “Imperial Tire Company,” and sold tires
with the name “Imperial” that were not made by the plaintiff’s business).
114. 284 F. 110 (7th Cir. 1922).
115. See id. at 110.
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quantity of the extract.116 The court stated that the term “Blue
Ribbon” signifies high merit and had long acquired special significance, wholly apart from its use as a trade name for any product.117
Holding that the term could only be protected as against other
beers, it was held that the defendant could use “Blue Ribbon” for
its brand of malt extract because no likelihood of confusion was
likely.118 The analysis of the court is unclear whether “Blue Ribbon” was seen as a descriptive or a suggestive term, but the court
clearly limited the scope of protection to a very narrow class of
product - the same exact product that the complainant marketed.119
The Pabst court neither mentioned the word “laudatory” nor stated
that the beer had ever been awarded a “Blue Ribbon”.120 Hence,
whether or not “Blue Ribbon” was seen as descriptive of the product was unclear.121
A few years later, the Second Circuit, in France Milling Co.
Inc. v. Washburn-Crosby Co. Inc.,122 stated that the term “Gold
Medal” is a laudatory phrase that is suggestive of merit.123 The
France Milling court further stated that the phrase is only joined
with a business by persistent advertising.124 For this reason, the
court held that “Gold Medal”, similar to “Blue Ribbon”, could only
be protected to the specific well-known commodity that it has
come to be associated with.125 The plaintiff in France Milling had
sued to protect its trade-mark “Gold Medal” in the prepared pan116. See id. at 111.
117. See id. at 112. Interestingly, the Court gave another definition from the Century Dictionary which stated that “Blue Ribbon” indicated membership in total abstinence organizations. Id. The Court further stated that “Blue Ribbon” had been registered
in the Patent Office over sixty times for a variety of products.
118. See Pabst Brewing v. Decatur Brewing Co., 284 F. 110, 113 (7th Cir. 1922).
The court found it noteworthy that the plaintiff, Pabst, had produced its own malt extract
and did not use the “Blue Ribbon” name. Id. at 111-112. Malt extract was used in the
production of home-brewed beer during the period of national prohibition.
119. See id. at 112-13.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. 7 F.2d 304, (2d Cir. 1925).
123. See France Milling Co. v. Washburn-Crosby Co., Inc., 7 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir.
1925).
124. See id. at 306. Persistent advertising is, of course, heavily linked with the concept of secondary meaning and terms that would be described as “descriptive.” See id.
125. See id.
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cake and buckwheat flour market.126 In 1904, the plaintiff obtained a gold medal for the flour at the Louisiana Purchase Exposition in St. Louis.127
The defendant and counter-claimant,
Washburn, one of the largest producers of wheat flour in the world,
had used “Gold Medal” as a trade-mark for wheat flour since 1880,
but had never, until 1923, produced or sold pancake flour.128 As of
1923, the two companies were competitors in the prepared flour
business. The court stated that as commercial commodities,
“straight” wheat flour and prepared flour were dissimilar.129 The
court did not stop there—-it then stated that among consumers,
“Gold Medal” flour meant defendant’s flour, but because the name
is not original per se, it could only be protected for the single item
of wheat flour that its registration was associated with.130 As can
be seen from the above, these two courts only protected the terms
“Blue Ribbon” and “Gold Medal” to the extent that they were used
in connection with a very specific item.131 The early trend, therefore, was to classify these laudatory terms as if they were vague
enough that no merchant should be allowed to monopolize the term
barring a showing that the public overwhelmingly identified the
laudatory term with a specific good that the merchant sold—
generally a “descriptive” type of analysis.132
Hughes v. Alfred H. Smith Co.133 discussed the term “Ideal” as
applied to hairbrushes and held that the term was not descriptive
and hence, was entitled to registration as a trademark.134 The court
126. See id.
127. See id. at 304. This fact makes this case somewhat distinguishable from Pabst
Brewing, where it is unclear if the beer had been awarded a Blue Ribbon.
128. See France Milling Co. v. Washburn-Crosby Co., Inc., 7 F.2d 304, 304 (2d Cir.
1925).
129. See id.
130. See id. at 306. (“One who devises a new . . . word to describe his wares
may . . . by timely suit prevent others from taking his word or set of words to gild the repute of even wholly different goods [ ]; but one who takes a phrase which is the commonplace of self-praise like ‘Blue Ribbon’ or ‘Gold Medal’ must be content with that
special field which he labels with so undistinctive a name.”)
131. See id.; see also Pabst Brewing, 284 F. at 112-13.
132. See LONG, supra note 49, at 47; Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World,
Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10 (2d. Cir. 1976).
133. 209 F. 37 (2d Cir. 1913).
134. See id. at 39. In 1886, Pearson obtained a patent for a brush. See id. at 38.
Hughes’s predecessors began selling similar brushes which led to an agreement between
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stated that the “Ideal” brushes were understood by consumers to be
associated with Hughes, the sellers of the brushes, and not Pearson,
the manufacturer of the brushes.135 The defendant argued unsuccessfully that the term “Ideal” had been so firmly connected with
the patented brush so as to become a generic name for the item.136
Returning to the alcoholic theme, in 1935, the Second Circuit
held that “Imperial” as applied to whisky could not be registered as
a valid trademark and therefore, the preliminary injunction issued
by the district court was reversed.137 The plaintiff claimed ownership of the trademark “Imperial” since 1933 and had been selling
distilled whiskey under the name “Imperial” since 1887, mainly in
Canada until 1891, when it began advertising and selling its whiskey in the United States.138 The defendant, in 1934, began selling
whiskey in three different grades, “De Luxe,” “Imperial,” and
“Regal.”139 Interestingly, the defendant’s sales of whiskey were
far larger than the plaintiff’s.140 The court first stated that “Imperial” was descriptive and indicative of quality.141 However, it then
stated that “Imperial” is a generic word, adjective in its nature and
invalid as a trademark.142 Yet, the court recognized that the question of whether a word is capable of becoming distinctive of the
products that a producer churns out might be a question of fact and
not to be determined solely on the basis of the descriptive qualities
of the term.143 Therefore, stating that the term could possibly function as a trademark and was not actually invalid, the court searched
for evidence of secondary meaning.144 The court noted the good

Pearson and Hughes’s predecessors whereby Pearson would only sell his brushes to
Hughes, with such brushes being called “Ideal.” Id.
135. See id.
136. See Hughes v. Alfred H. Smith Co. 209 F. 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1913).
137. See Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc. v. Penn-Maryland Corp., 79 F.2d 836 (2d Cir.
1935).
138. See id. at 837.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id. The court also stated that “Imperial” is commonly used as a synonym
for imposing size, appearance or excellence. See id. at 835.
142. See Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc. v. Penn-Maryland Corp., 79 F.2d 836, 835 (2d
Cir. 1935).
143. See id.
144. See id. at 839.
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faith on the part of the defendants and stated that because the defendant had no intention of utilizing the good name of the plaintiff
to sell its own products, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to provide evidence that “‘Imperial’ and the certain whisky made by it
had become synonymous to the buying public.”145 In this case, the
court differed with the France Milling court in that here, the court
stated “Imperial” was “descriptive” and “generic”146 whereas in
France Milling, the court stated that “Gold Medal” was “suggestive” of merit.147
The United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, in
1954, stated that the phrase “Consistently Superior” was laudatory
or exclamatory, and the applicant seeking to register this phrase on
the Principal Register of the United States Patent Office would
need to have very convincing proof that the term had acquired distinctiveness under the Lanham Act; this mark did not meet that
high burden.148 The applicant had used “Consistently Superior” in
conjunction with its bakery products since 1919 but did not file an
application to register the phrase as a trademark until 1947.149 The
applicant advertised its products and the phrase in order forms,
pamphlets, magazines, and on the side of the applicant’s trucks.150
145. Id. at 839.
146. See id. at 837-38.
147. See France Milling Co. v. Washburn-Crosby Co., 7 F.2d 304,306 (2d Cir.
1925).
148. See Application of Duvernoy & Sons, Inc. 212 F.2d 202 (C.C.P.A. 1954). 15
U.S.C.A. § 1052 states:
Except as expressly excluded . . . nothing herein shall prevent the registration
of a mark used by the applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant’s
goods in commerce. The Commissioner may accept as prima facie evidence
that the mark has become distinctive, as applied to the applicant’s goods in
commerce, proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof as a
mark by the applicant in commerce for the five years next preceding the date of
the filing of the application for its registration.
Id.
149. See id. at 203.
150. See id. The court quoted approvingly from the Soliciter for the Patent Office:
It is submitted that the evidence in the present case clearly fails to show that the
primary purpose of the words ‘Consistently Superior’ was to indicate origin.
There is no exhibit offered in which those words appear without the name of
the appellant and, in most cases, the words are much less prominently displayed
than the name. Thus, for example, on the wagons and trucks pictured . . . [in]
the record, the name Duvernoy & Sons, Inc., always appears in bold letters,
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Besides stating that the mark had not attained the pivotal distinctiveness, the court also held that “Consistently Superior” is a laudatory statement incapable of indicating the source of a good or service.151 Interestingly, the court did not mention the “descriptive”,
“suggestive”, or “generic” designations in its opinion.152
The 1960’s may have ushered in a change in American thinking, but the courts continued prodding along in their analysis of
laudatory terms. The Murray Corporation of America opposed
Red Spot Paint and Varnish Company’s application for a trademark of the term “Easytint” because the latter wished to use that
term for white paint that was made to be mixed with other colors
of paint, and the former had previously registered “Easy” for use
with “[e]namel supplied in self-spraying containers for application
to domestic laundry and other appliances”.153 The question for the
court was whether “Easytint” was sufficiently close to “Easy” so as
to be likely to cause confusion to consumers.154 At the outset, the
court found “Easy” to be suggestive and that the plaintiff was not
entitled to exclusive use of “Easy.”155 Noting that the marks prod-

while ‘Consistently Superior’ is so small as to be almost illegible in some of the
photographs. It is scarcely conceivable that anyone seeing such a wagon or
truck could form the opinion that the words ‘Consistently Superior’ were relied
on to inform the public as to the origin of the product.
Id. at 204.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 202-04.
153. The Murray Corp. of America v. Red Spot Paint and Varnish Co., 280 F.2d
158, 159 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
154. See id.
155. See id. at 160-61. In reaching its conclusion, the court noted a number of third
party registrations for paint products such as “Easycoat,” “Eze-Ply,” “Easy Way” and
“Strikeasy”. See id. at 159 n.2. The court also surveyed the “1953 Trademark Directory”
issued by the Trademark Bureau of the National Paint, Varnish and Lacquer Association,
Inc. which included various marks such as “Easy,” “Easyflo,” “Easy-Kote,” “Easylac,”
“E-Z-Cleen,” “E-Z-Duz-It,” “and “Ezy-To-Use.” See id. at 159 n.3. In noting the plethora of marks, the court stated:
In determining whether a word or syllable has a descriptive or suggestive significance as applied to merchandise it is proper to take notice of the extent to
which it has been used in trademarks by others on such merchandise. If it has
been frequently so used, the inference is warranted that it is not purely arbitrary; that it would be likely to be understood by purchasers as identifying or
describing the merchandise itself, rather than the source thereof, and hence as
having little or no trademark significance.
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ucts were somewhat different and were sold through different
channels, the court stated that no likelihood of confusion existed.156 In 1962, the Second Circuit held that the phrase “Supreme” could not be protected absent a clear showing that the
phrase had come to be regarded among consumers as indicative of
the company’s vodka.157 The appellant in this action was questioning the Patent Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, which
sustained the appellee’s opposition to the appellant’s registration of
the trademark “Supreme”.158 The court stated that such expressions are “puffing of wares” which do not indicate of origin, are
generally available to all companies, and therefore are not entitled

Id. at 392 (quoting Shoe Corp. of Am. v. Juvenile Shoe Corp. of Am., 266 F.2d 793, 796
(C.C.P.A., 1959).
156. See id. at 159-61. The factors used to determine likelihood of confusion are:
(1) the strength of the plaintiff’s mark, (2) the degree of similarity between the
plaintiff’s and the defendant’s marks, (3) the proximity of the products, (4) the
likelihood that the plaintiff will ‘bridge the gap’ between the two products, (5)
actual confusion between the two marks, (6) the defendant’s good faith in
adopting its mark, (7) the quality of the defendant’s product(s), and (8) the sophistication of buyers of the plaintiff’s and defendant’s goods or services.
Sports Authority, 89 F.3d at 960 (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d
492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961)); see also Plus Prods. v. Medstet Modalities Assoc., Inc., 211
U.S.P.Q. 1199 (1981) (holding that “Zn-Plus,” “Mn-Plus,” and “Ca-Plus” for vitamin
supplements were compound marks, suggestive in nature, and not in conflict with the opposer’s mark, “Plus,” also in the vitamin field); Visa Int. Service Ass’n. v. E. Fin. Fed.
Credit Union 967 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that opposer’s mark for its network
linking automatic teller machines, “Plus System”, was a weak and suggestive term,
laudatory in nature, similar to Plus Product’s marks, and that Visa could not get a preliminary injunction preventing Eastern from using a “Money Plus” Mastercard); Avtex
Fibers Inc. v. Gentex Corp., 223 U.S.P.Q. 625 (T.T.A.B. 1984) (holding that “PFR Plus”
is not merely descriptive, but rather suggests that the applicant’s fabrics contain something more than permanently flame retardant fibers and therefore, the term is registrable).
157. See Supreme Wine Co., Inc. v. The Am. Distilling Co., 310 F.2d 888 (2d Cir.
1962). The court relied on In re Lewis Cigar Mfg. Co., 95 U.S.P.Q. 224 (Pat. Off. 1952),
which stated:
Section 23 of the [Lanham] Act does not prohibit the registration of a trademark merely because it is laudatory in character. However, Section 23 does require that the mark be of such a nature that it is capable of distinguishing applicant’s goods or services. From the above quoted definition of ‘Supreme’ it is
seen that it is a common ordinary laudatory term which is available for use by
producers of merchandise in various fields to advertise their products, and
hence is incapable of indicating the source of origin.
Supreme Wine Co., 310 F.2d at 890.
158. See id. at 888-89.
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to trademark protection.159
In 1970, the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, in Roux Laboratories, Inc., v. Clairol Inc.,160 stated that the
phrase “Hair Color So Natural Only Her Hairdresser Knows For
Sure” was laudatory and “somewhat descriptive” of the desired
qualities of the product but capable of acquiring distinctiveness as
a trademark if it had acquired secondary meaning among consumers.161 Roux’s opposition to the registration of this term was based
on a belief that it, like Clairol, was in the business of selling hair
tinting products and that it had used certain descriptive terms in its
advertisements.162 The court noted that Clairol had a very successful advertising campaign163 which sufficiently hyped the slogan so
that it served as a means by which consumers could identify the
goods from a certain source.164
Demonstrating that reversals of lower court decisions are not
uncommon in laudatory mark analysis, the Patent Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, reversing the Examiner of Trademarks, held that “Super Iron” was suggestive and registrable because it either signified that the soil supplement contained a greater
amount of iron than most soil supplements or contained iron of a
higher quality than the iron found in other soil supplements.165
The court distinguished this situation from one where the term
159. See id. at 889. The court relied on the test in Hiram Walker and stated that the
applicant did not meet this burden of showing that the term had come to be associated
with its products. Id.
160. 427 F.2d 823 (1970).
161. See id. at 828. The court found that Clairol’s large amount of advertising had
made an impact in the public and the phrase could be registered. See id. at 829.
162. See id. at 824. Roux had used the following advertising copy in its ads: “only
you and your hairdresser know where nature stopped and Roux began,” “to pick up
where nature left off . . . [t]he essence of haircoloring is to look so natural that no one
knows you used a cosmetic.” See id. at 824 n.3.
163. See id. at 825. The ads featured a large, color photograph of an attractive
woman, often accompanied by a young child; the question ‘Does she . . . or doesn’t she?’
prominently imprinted on or above the photograph; the slogan ‘Hair Color So Natural
Only Her Hairdresser Knows For Sure’ also conspicuously imprinted on or below the
photograph, and set apart from the other portions of the advertisement. See id.
164. See Roux Laboratories, 427 F.2d 823, 831 (1970).
165. See In re Occidental Petroleum Corp., 167 U.S.P.Q. 128 (T.T.A.B. 1970). The
Examiner of Trademarks refused registration, stating that “‘super’ is variously defined as
having the (specified) ingredient present in a large or unusually large proportion. . . .” Id.
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“Super” is used in conjunction with the name of the applicant’s
goods.166 Further showing the uncertainty in the system is the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board in the In re Ralston Purina Company matter.167 An
application was filed to register “Ralston Super Slush,” “Slush”
disclaimed, on the Principal Register for a concentrate that is used
to make a slush drink.168 The Examiner refused registration on the
ground that “Super” when used in combination with goods, is
solely an “adjectival superlative that merely describes a quality of
applicant’s slush drink and therefore must be included in the disclaimer with the word “Slush”.169 The Board stated that “whether
a term or word is merely descriptive must be decided in relation to
the goods or services for which registration is sought, the context
in which it is used, and the average purchasers of such goods or
services.”170 After noting that the term “Super” had been held to
be both descriptive and suggestive, the Board found that the term
“Super” was heavily used in advertising as puffery and connotated
a vague desirable quality that was not merely descriptive of the
product it was associated with, a concentrate for making a slush
type soft drink, the Examiner was reversed and registration was allowed.171
In a trademark infringement case in which the plaintiff’s corporate name was possibly being diluted, the First Circuit, in 1972,
stated that “Valmor,” as applied to goods such as face powder, talcum powder, wigs and hair tonic, was suggestive of quality.172
Standard Products Corporation, the defendant, appealed from an
order of the district court enjoining it from further use of “Valmor”
in its beauty aid products, and canceling its registration of “Val-

166. See id.
167. 191 U.S.P.Q. 237 (T.T.A.B. 1976).
168. See id. at 237-38.
169. See id.
170. See id.; see also In Re Crompton Co., 170 U.S.P.Q. 166 (T.T.A.B. 1971)
(holding that the term “super Wle” for corduroy fabric is not merely descriptive, even
though it is laudatory in nature).
171. See Ralston Purina, 191 U.S.P.Q. at 238.
172. See Valmor Prods. Co. v. Standard Prods. Corp., 464 F.2d 200, 202 (1st Cir.
1972).
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mor.”173 Also, the court stated that although under some circumstances self-laudatory trademarks should not be registered or protected, the plaintiff, through forty-five years of advertising, had established a strong link between the mark and its products.174
In In re American Cynamid Company,175 the Patent Office
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, in 1973, found the phrase
“The Premium Grade Malathion” capable of functioning as a
trademark for an insecticide, and therefore the term could be registered on the Supplemental Register.176 Hitting on a recurrent
theme of reversing lower courts, the Board reversed the Examiner’s decision that the trademark was so descriptive as to be incapable of distinguishing the applicant’s insecticide from other similar products.177 The Board noted that the phrase was laudatory but
still capable of protection.178 The Board was persuaded by the applicant’s showing of the mark’s conspicuous location on the labels
of the product, the level of advertising, and affidavits from twenty
one mosquito control officers from various parts of the country
stating that they associate “The Premium Grade Malathion” with
the applicant.179 Recognize this case is different than the others
above because the applicant sought to register the phrase on the

173. See id. at 201. The defendant’s registrations for “VALMOR,” canceled by the
district court, were for a combination electric hair brush and massager, a cordless electric
manicure set, an electric hair curling iron and similar other products. Id.
174. See id. at 202. The Appellate court held the district court’s finding that there
was a likelihood of confusion (the federal statutory test of trademark infringement) not to
be clearly erroneous. See id. at 203. The district court concluded that there was a “substantial likelihood of confusion in the minds of consumers as to the source of the various
products sold under the Valmor name.” Valmor Prods. Co. v. Standard Prods. Corp., 464
F.2d 200, 202 (1st Cir. 1972). This conclusion was based on findings that the products of
the plaintiff and defendant were closely related in function, were advertised in similar
places, appealed to the same consumer demographic and were sold in the same type of
store. See id.
175. 176 U.S.P.Q. 350 (T.T.A.B. 1973).
176. See id. at 351. The test for whether something could be registered on the Supplemental Register is whether the mark could become recognized, through use in commerce, by the average purchaser or is distinctive of the applicant’s goods. See OATHOUT,
supra note 4, at 82-83. Prior distinctiveness is not a prerequisite for registration of a
mark on the Supplemental Register. See id.
177. See American Cynamid Co., 176 U.S.P.Q. at 350-51.
178. See id.
179. See id. at 350.
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more lenient Supplemental Register rather than on the Principal
Register.180
Plus Products v. Redken Laboratories, Inc.181 is a variation on
the current theme because it discusses the protection that laudatory
terms are afforded when these words are combined with other nonlaudatory words. In Plus Products, the opposer of the registration
had been using “Plus” as a trademark for cosmetics, vitamins
preparations for the skin and hair, high protein products, and vitamins.182 The applicant applied to register “pH-Plus” for a successful line of cosmetic products that had been used for approximately
five years under that name.183 The “likelihood of confusion” issue
turned on whether the simultaneous marketing of the various products of applicant and opposer with the “pH Plus” and “Plus” marks
respectively, were likely to cause confusion.184 After noting the
plethora of marks for cosmetics and toiletries that contain the word
“Plus”, the Appeal Board stated that highly suggestive terms, because of their prolific registration, have been given limited protection only for a “substantially identical designation and/or to the
subsequent use thereof on substantially similar goods.”185 The
Board then stated that the addition of another term, whether suggestive or descriptive, to a highly suggestive or laudatory term,
may be sufficient to distinguish between the two marks at issue.186
In this case, the court said it was a very close call whether “pH”
could distinguish in this manner because the products at issue were
very similar.187 In holding that “pH-Plus” was not primarily descriptive of the applicant’s goods, the Board heavily relied on the
amount of sales and advertising accruing to the applicant and then
180. See id.
181. 199 U.S.P.Q. 111 (T.T.A.B. 1978).
182. See id. at 112.
183. See id. at 113.
184. See id. at 114. The Board stated that the suggestive connotation of “Plus” is
the exact reason why the applicant, opposer, and others in various fields have utilized
and/or registered as trademarks designations that contain the word “Plus”. Id. at 115.
However, the Board reiterated that these other valid registrations will not validate the applicant’s mark if it would be confusingly similar to another mark. See id.
185. Id. at 116. Marks registered included “Beauty Plus,” “Plus 30,” “Color Plus,”
“K-Plus,” and “Iron Plus.” Id. at 115.
186. See id. at 116-17.
187. See id. at 117.
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concluded that for those people exposed to the advertising of the
applicant, “pH-Plus” served as an indication of source.188 The
Board primarily looked to the applicant’s large sales volume to
find that there was no likelihood of confusion.189
The Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board, when deciding In Re Wileswood, Inc.,190 stated that its task
was to determine “whether ‘America’s Best Popcorn!’ and ‘America’s Favorite Popcorn!’. . . are merely suggestive of high quality . . ., and thus registrable . . . or are so laudatory and lacking in
the ability to distinguish applicant’s goods . . . as to be unregistrable.”191 The applicant claimed that to be unregisterable under the
Act, the mark must be ‘only’ descriptive of the goods.192 Furthermore, the applicant argued that the mark as a whole must be
weighed and that these marks were “attention getting, tongue-incheek, self-laudatory, or boastful designations or characterizations
of its popcorn” which could not be literally true because no one
could objectively measure this popcorn against all others.193 The
Board stated that the meaning of the marks must incorporate the
goods which they are linked with, the context these expressions are
used, the relevance of the marks in relation to the goods, and the
probable reaction of consumers to the phrases as these phrases are
perceived in the market.194 No advertising expenditures were included in the record though the Board noted that the products were
sold in only three retail outlets.195 Since the Board found that the
terms were laudatory and descriptive, it held that proof of secondary meaning was required in order to register these term.196 Following the rationale of McCarthy’s treatise,197 the Board further
188. See Plus Prod. v. Redken Lab., Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q. 111 (T.T.A.B. 1978). The
term “pH” was disclaimed as a measure of acidity or alkalinity. Id.
189. See id.
190. 201 U.S.P.Q. 400 (1978).
191. See id. at 401.
192. See id. at 400; 15 U.S.C.A. § 1052(e).
193. See id. at 400-01.
194. See id. at 401.
195. See In Re Wileswood, Inc. 201 U.S.P.Q. at 401-02.
196. See id. at 404. The Board looked to an earlier case that canceled that registration on the Supplemental Register of “America’s Finest” for overalls. See Kotzin v. Levi
Strauss & Company, 111 U.S.P.Q. 161 (1956).
197. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 11:18.
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stated that because a descriptive term merely informs the consumer
of the supposed quality of a product, and many products have similar qualities, the descriptive term will not assist the consumer in
differentiating products of different producers.198 The Board cited
BEST for writing paper and TASTY for bread as examples of
terms that are laudatory and informative, stating that the information conveyed is the vendor’s claims for its wares.199 Refusal of
registration was affirmed.200
The issue of how a laudatory mark can change over time was
discussed in 20th Century Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust Inc.,201
in which the Second Circuit reversed the district court and held
that “Cozy Warm Energy Savers” was a descriptive term with a
meaning that had changed over time.202 The plaintiff was in the
business of selling women’s pajamas and nightgowns to retailers,
mail order and discount houses.203 The defendant, located in the
building next to the plaintiff’s, sold these same items as well as
many other clothing items.204 The plaintiff’s garments came in
plastic bags which contained various inserts, one stating in bold
print “Cozy Warm ENERGY SAVERS” in white with the trademark notice attached.205 The mark was accepted by the Trademark
Office on the condition that 20th Century, the plaintiff, disclaim
exclusive use of “cozy” and “warm” apart from the registered

198. See In re Wileswood, Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. at 402.
199. See id. at 402-04. See also Burmel Handkerchief Corp. v. Cluett, Peabody &
Co., 127 F.2d 318, 29 C.C.P.A. 1024 (1942) (holding “Handkerchiefs of the Year” invalid). The court explained:
In the final analysis such expressions as we are discussing with relation to objects of trade are a ‘puffing of wares’ and are intended to call attention to the
superiority of the advertised goods. Such expressions are a condensed form of
describing in detail the outstanding character or quality of the objects to which
they are applied . . . [C]ommon expression[s] which can indicate nothing but
high quality surely would not be indicative of origin to the purchasing public.
Id.; In re Nat’l. Tea Co., 166 U.S.P.Q. 288 (T.T.A.B. 1970) (holding the expression
“Smackin Good” as applied to food products was similar to “delicious” and merely descriptive of the quality of the goods).
200. See id. at 404.
201. 747 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
202. See id. at 87.
203. See id. at 85.
204. See id. at 85.
205. See id.
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mark.206 Just a few months after registration, defendant began selling pajamas and nightgowns using a tag containing the words
“Cozy Warm CONSERVES-ENERGY.”207 The writing was quite
similar to 20th Century’s.208 The Second Circuit stated that before
the energy crisis in the 1970’s, the mark would have been considered suggestive, but in 1984, the term was merely descriptive of
the product and needed secondary meaning to be protected.209 The
Second Circuit stated that as a result of the energy crisis in the
1970’s, numerous clothing vendors began using terms such as “energy saving” and “cozy warm” to push the acceptance of their
products.210 This led to a well-informed public, the court continued, so that consumers could readily link the term to the virtues of
the product.211 The Second Circuit also stated that a term can be
descriptive in two ways—”[i]t can literally describe the product, or
it can describe the purpose or utility of the product.”212 The case
was remanded so that the district court could look into secondary
meaning.213
In 1986, the Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board dealt with a foreign translation issue when it upheld
the decision of the Examining Attorney and refused to register the
term “Selecta” for a beer.214 The Board rejected the applicant’s

206. See 20th Century Wear, 747 F.2d at 85.
207. See id. at 85-6.
208. See id. at 86.
209. See id. at 88.
210. See id.
211. See 20th Century Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust Inc., 747 F.2d 81, 88 (2d Cir.
1984), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
212. See id.; see also RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION,
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 18.05 (4th ed. 1983). Under the first branch, “if qualities, ingredients, effects or other features of the product are indicated naturally and in ordinary language, so that the consumer understands its significance without any exercise
of the imagination, the words are descriptive.” Id. Under the second strand, Callmann
explains three subcategories of marks that describe the product’s purpose or utility: “(1)
marks describing the problem or condition that the trademarked product is designed to
remedy . . .; (2) marks that describe the use to which the product or service is put; and (3)
marks that describe the effect that the product or service is suppose to produce after it is
used.” 747 F.2d at 88 (citing CALLMANN § 18.05).
213. See 20th Century Wear, 747 F.2d at 90.
214. See In Re San Miguel Corporation, 229 U.S.P.Q. 617 (T.T.A.B. 1986) (refusing registration on the ground that SELECTA was merely descriptive of the beer.)
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position that the mark, the Spanish term for “Select”, would not be
translated to “Select” by the average beer purchaser and therefore
would be viewed as an indication of origin.215 Using the doctrine
of foreign equivalents, under which the foreign words are translated into their English equivalents and then tested for descriptiveness or genericness, the Board concluded that the term was “laudatorily descriptive.”216
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows sued to
protect their slogan, “The Greatest Show on Earth”.217 Ringling
Bros., the owner of the trademark, obtained a preliminary injunction from the lower court, that was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit, against the defendant’s car dealership that ordered the defendant to cease using the phrase “The Greatest Used Car Show On
Earth”.218 The district court had found that the Ringling Bro.’s
mark was descriptive and weak, but also believed that the mark
had become associated with the famous circus.219 The Seventh
Circuit found that the defendant, by utilizing big red circus-styled
lettering, attempted to use the slogan in a way that was designed to
evoke the circus.220 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit found that protecting the Ringling Bros. mark would not be the equivalent of
granting Ringling Bros. a monopoly over other laudatory slogans.221 The “final straw” was the court’s finding that the defendant did not act in good faith when it first used its slogan.222
In 1989, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board and held that “Deluxe” for
canned pork and beans could be registered on the Supplemental
Register, because it was capable of becoming distinctive through

215. See id. at 618.
216. See id. “Select” had been disclaimed on the applications of beer producers in
the past (i.e. Stroh’s and Koehler). In addition, the Board noted that numerous third parties outside the business industry had used this term in their marks to describe the alleged
high quality of their product. Id.
217. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. CelozziEttelson Chevrolet, Inc., 855 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1988).
218. See id. at 481.
219. See id.
220. See id. at 482.
221. See id at 482-83.
222. See Ringling Bros., 855 F.2d at 484.
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use in commerce, even though the term is merely descriptive and
could not be registered on the Principal Register.223 The Court
admitted that the term is generally a laudatory one, but “laudation
is not inimical to a term’s capability of functioning as a trademark.”224 The term did not describe a particular grade of canned
pork and beans.225 The Court went on to state that first, the
C.C.P.A. has previously described “Deluxe” as “obviously suggestive” and “descriptive.”226 Second, “Deluxe” was used in many
trademarks and trade names.227 Lastly, the capability of “Deluxe”
to function as a trademark is shown by the many registrations of
the term for various food products.228 The Board had argued first,
that “Deluxe” is not a common descriptive name for canned pork
and beans containing bacon and brown sugar and second, does not
signify anything other than a “vaguely desirable characteristic”.229
However, the Federal Circuit relied on previous registrations for
“Deluxe” and held that because of the lenient requirements of the
Supplemental Register, the applicant had a right to register the
mark there.230
The Second Circuit, in a case mentioned in the Introduction,
recently dealt with the issue of a numeric term, “100%”, as a

223. See In re Bush Bros. & Co., 884 F.2d 569 (Fed. Cir. 1989); 15 U.S.C.A. §
1052(f) (providing that five years of exclusive and continuous use as a mark may be
deemed prima facie evidence of secondary meaning.); see also supra note 176, for a discussion of the Supplemental Register; In re Wella Corp., 565 F.2d 143, 144 (C.C.P.A.
1977) (stating that “descriptiveness alone does not necessarily preclude registration on
the Supplemental Register.”), quoted in Bush Bros., 884 F.2d at 570. The Bush Brothers
court noted that generally, courts have not scrutinized potential applications for registration on the Supplemental Register because obtaining registration on this Register is very
liberal. Id. at 570.
224. 884 F.2d at 572. The Court relied on In re Ralston Purina, 191 U.S.P.Q. 237
(T.T.A.B. 1976), In re Am. Cynamid, 176 U.S.P.Q. 350 (T.T.A.B. 1973), and In re Occidental Petroleum, 167 U.S.P.Q. 128 (T.T.A.B. 1970). Id.
225. See 884 F.2d at 572. The applicant’s canned pork and beans contained bacon
and brown sugar. See id. at 571-72.
226. See id. The Court noted that “Deluxe Choice” for pasteurized processed
cheese and “Creamy Deluxe” for frostings (with a disclaimer for creamy) have been registered on the Principal Register. Id.
227. See id.
228. See 884 F.2d, at 572.
229. Id.
230. See id.
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laudatory mark.231 Both the plaintiff, Estee Lauder, and the defendant, The Gap, were planning on using “100%” as part of their
trademark and in conjunction with their respective skin care products.232 Estee Lauder beat The Gap to the market and sued to prevent The Gap from using this term on its products.233 The Southern District of New York found that Lauder’s “100%” mark was
suggestive and therefore protectable because the term “100%” had
no particular meaning, but rather suggested an idea of quality.234
New York’s Southern District also found that “100% Time Release
Moisturizer”, the full name of Lauder’s product, was suggestive in
nature.235 The Second Circuit agreed that 100% was suggestive
and stated “[a] term that is merely self-laudatory, such as ‘plus’ or
‘super,’ seeking to convey the impression that a product is excellent or of especially high quality, is generally deemed suggestive.”236 Additionally, the court noted that marks should be looked
at in context, rather than in the abstract.237 When looking at the
mark in context, the Court determined that because “100% Time
Release Moisturizer” had a few possible meanings, the term was
suggestive and protected without any analysis of secondary meaning.238 However, the court found that because there was no likelihood of confusion among ordinarily prudent consumers, Estee
Lauder was not entitled to relief.239 The Court implied that nu231. See Estee Lauder Inc. v. The Gap, Inc., 108 F.3d 1503 (2d Cir. 1997).
232. Id. at 1506.
233. Id. at 1506-07.
234. See Estee Lauder, Inc. v. The Gap, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 595, 608 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), rev’d on other grounds, 108 F.3d 1503 (2d Cir. 1997).
235. See id. at 609. The court said the phrase “100% Time Release Moisturizer”
could be interpreted three ways: “(1) this bottle contains nothing but time release moisturizer, (2) this product moisturizes 100% of the time, and (3) this is 100% (the brand)
time release moisturizer . . . .” Id.
236. Estee Lauder, 108 F.3d, at 1509. See, e.g., Plus Prods. v. Plus Discount Foods,
Inc., 722 F.2d 999, 1005 (2d Cir. 1983) (“‘PLUS,’ when applied to goods, ‘merely implies additional quantity or quality’”); cited in Estee Lauder, 108 F.3d at 1509; In re Ralston Purina Co., 191 U.S.P.Q. at 237-38 (“‘SUPER,’ when used to ‘connote a vague desirable characteristic or quality allegedly connected with [a] product,’ is suggestive”)
cited in Estee Lauder, 108 F.3d at 1509.
237. Estee Lauder, 108 F.3d at 1509.
238. See id. at 1510.
239. See id. at 1510-12. The Second Circuit found that the “100%” in both products
were (1)dissimilar in appearance; (2)the packaging was different; (3)”100” is not original; 4)the products are sold in different stores; (5)Estee Lauder’s product would be priced
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merical terms, if used in a vague, non-arbitrary way and not used
because an attribute was actually measured or tested, are in danger
of not being protected by the Lanham Act.240 It has been suggested that the court may have been making a distinction between
“laudatory terms that describe some quality of a product . . . which
it would deem ‘descriptive’ - and those laudatory terms that merely
assert high-quality generally regardless of the product or service . . . which it would deem ‘suggestive’.”241
The final case discussed in this Part, Platinum Home Mortgage
Corp. v. Platinum Financial Group, Inc.,242 shows that the analysis
of courts is no better now than it was many years ago. In this matter, the plaintiff, an offeror of mortgage services, sought a preliminary injunction to keep the defendant, another offeror of mortgage
services, from using “Platinum” in its name.243 The Seventh Circuit stated that under the common law, terms denoting quality were
protectable only upon a showing of secondary meaning.244 The
lower court explained that the rationale for labeling these terms as
descriptive is that “adjectives which can be truthfully applied to a
whole range of goods and services cannot identify the goods of one
particular firm.”245 Similar to the court in 20th Century, the lower
court stated that words indicating quality often see their meanings

almost twenty times more than the Gap’s; (6)Estee Lauder does not plan to enter Gap’s
market; and (7)and that the Gap did not act in bad faith. Id. at 1512.
240. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(A) (West 1998). Lauder’s vice president of skin care
marketing decided to use “100%” as the trademark “because it would suggest to consumers certain attributes of” the product—its long lasting quality and the notion that it is the
best such product available. See 932 F. Supp. at 599.
241. Dawn Marie Bottie, Marketer v. Lawyer: Age-Old Tension Resurfaces in Gap
100% Case, 3 INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST 8, (May 1997).
242. 149 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 1997).
243. See id. at 725. Both parties offered their services in Illinois.
244. See id. at 728; see also Platinum Home Mortgage Corp. v. Platinum Fin. Grp.,
Inc., No. 97 C 5293, 1997 WL 567909, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 5, 1997), aff’d 149 F.3d 722
(citing In re Bush Bros., 884 F.2d 569 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Plus Products v. Plus Discount
Foods, 722 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1983); Hiram Walker & Sons v. Penn-Maryland Corp., 79
F.2d 836 (2d Cir.1935)).
245. See Platinum Home Mortgage Corp., 1997 WL 567909, at *2 (citing 2
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS § 11:18). The Seventh Circuit stated “Platinum” describes
the quality of the plaintiff’s services but the term does not identify one particular source
or origin of these services. See Platinum, 149 F.3d at 728.
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change over time and across cultures.246 Furthermore, the lower
court stated that once, people thought of “Platinum” primarily to
describe jewelry or metal, but today people think of the term as indicating excellence; it may be truthfully applied to many goods and
services.247 Agreeing with the lower court, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that the term was descriptive, and that “Platinum” described the quality of the plaintiff’s business and needed secondary
meaning to be protected, connection that could not be found.248
III. LAUDATORY TERMS ARE LITERALLY SUGGESTIVE, NOT
DESCRIPTIVE, YET SHOULD NOT BE PROTECTED UNDER THE
LANHAM ACT ABSENT SECONDARY MEANING
In this last section of this piece two general arguments will be
championed. It will first be shown that laudatory terms, despite often being treated in a legal sense as if they were descriptive, are in
fact suggestive of the products they represent. By employing a
broad definition of “descriptive,” it can be shown that the terms
discussed throughout this piece do not come within the definition.
It will also be posited that secondary meaning should be found before these terms can be protected. In this context, many of the
courts’ decisions and/or rationales will be critiqued. Lastly, a simple solution will be proposed that should help the courts successfully cope with the laudatory term issue.
A. Laudatory Terms, No Matter How One Slices Them, Do
Not Describe Anything
Though Professor McCarthy states that laudatory terms are descriptive,249 this can be quickly disproved by an analysis into the
actual meaning of “descriptive.” It can be shown that laudatory
terms are not “descriptive” by stating the broadest definition of
“descriptive” found and then showing that even this inclusive definition is not adequate to keep the laudatory terms discussed above
within its grasp. The definition provided by Rudolf Callmann will

246.
247.
248.
249.

See Platinum Home Mortgage Corp., 1997 WL 567909 at *2-3.
See id.
Platinum, 149 F.3d at 728-29.
See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 11:17.
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be used: a term can be descriptive in two ways—”[i]t can literally
describe the product, or it can describe the purpose or utility of the
product.”250 Callmann breaks down “descriptive” into two segments. Under the first branch, “if qualities, ingredients, effects or
other features of the product are indicated naturally and in ordinary
language, so that the consumer understands its significance without
any exercise of the imagination, the words are descriptive.”251 Under the second strand, Callmann explains three subcategories of
marks that describe the product’s purpose or utility.252 First,
“marks describing the problem or condition that the trademarked
product is designed to remedy.”253 Second, “marks that describe
the use to which the product or service is put.”254 Last, “marks that
describe the effect that the product or service is suppose to produce
after it is used.”255
Beginning with the first branch, the laudatory terms discussed
above do not describe a quality of the product. A quality of a
product is an attribute of a product that someone can pin down or
recognize and declare unequivocally, “this apple is green” or “this
tomato sauce is thick.” Ah, you say, but who is to judge whether
the sauce (Sauce X) is thick or not. Perhaps mom made the thickest sauce around and even though sauce X is probably the thickest
on the market, mother’s loving children believe it is not up to
snuff. This is a good point—but an irrelevant one for the argument. It is clear that thickness can be judged on a scale, a makebelieve “thickometer,” or even by a simple comparison with the
help of a strainer. The thickness measurement, in comparison to
terms such as “Blue Ribbon”—assuming that no prize was ever
won, “Imperial,” and “Supreme,” is precise. These latter three
terms do not describe an attribute or a quality of a product, and
hence, would be next to impossible to measure.
Also, the laudatory terms listed in the preceding paragraph do

250. 747 F.2d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 1984); see also CALLMANN, supra note 211, §§ 18.04,
18.05 (discussing the 20th Century Wear Inc. precedent).
251. CALLMANN, supra note 211, § 18.05.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
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not describe an ingredient of a product. In the sauce example, tomato would be descriptive of an ingredient in the sauce—no tomato, no sauce. Hence, labeling the sauce tomato-like would be
descriptive of the sauce under anyone’s definition. Attempting to
say that imperialness or supremacy is an ingredient of the sauce
would be nonsensical.
Next, the effects of the product cannot be described by the
laudatory terms discussed earlier. An effect of a product can be
explained by an aspirin which will affect the body’s blood flow
and hopefully, the headache. If the tomato sauce is very spicy, it
will make one’s mouth burn. If a product is “supreme” it will not
have a predictable effect. It is not possible for a product to “supreme” my mouth or “imperialize” me. Hence, laudatory terms,
do not indicate effects in “natural and ordinary language”. It is
necessary then, to analyze the second branch of the operative definition.
The last part of the first branch of Callmann’s definition mentions “other features.” Because Callmann introduces the first
branch of his definition with the word “literal,” it appears clear that
these “other features” are meant to be interpreted as attributes that
can be seen or measured in some way. A literal feature of Sauce X
might be its thickness or color. It most definitely would not be its
imperialness or its supremacy. Therefore, laudatory terms, represented by the few noted above, do not meet the first branch of
Callmann’s “descriptive” definition because they do not describe
qualities, ingredients, effects, or other features of a product in natural and ordinary language.256
The second branch of Callmann’s definition of descriptiveness
can be disposed of as well. The first of the three subcategories under this strand of the definition are “marks that describe a problem
or condition that the trademarked product is designed to remedy.”257 A mark such as “Headache-Gone” or “So-Long Bad
Breath” might satisfy this requirement. It is clear, for instance, that
“Super Iron,” “Plus,” and “America’s Best” do not describe a problem that the good or service can cure. The second part of this
256. See CALLMANN, supra note 212, § 18.05.
257. Id.
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strand of the definition of descriptiveness relates to the uses to
which the product can be put. “Super Iron,” “Plus,” and “America’s Best” do not meet this requirement. None of these terms, by
itself, describe how a product can be used to satisfy a need. All
three terms are too general and vague to be pinned down in this
fashion.
The last hurdle set up by Callmann’s definition is his statement
that “marks that describe the effect that the product or service is
suppose[d] to produce” are “descriptive.”258 Could someone feel
more “Plus” today than he or she did yesterday? It would be
highly unlikely. In addition, it is a virtual certainty that someone
could not possibly feel more “Imperial” or “Supreme” as a factual
matter. Perhaps, after eating the top quality sauce, one will feel
like he or she is part of the “in” crowd, but this emotion is not aptly
stated in the laudatory terms I have mentioned above. Once, again,
these terms are too vague to be applied in this manner. By utilizing a very broad definition of “descriptive” and showing that
laudatory terms do not fall within its reach, the concept of suggestiveness must be examined to see if these terms fit nicely into its
arms.
B. Laudatory Terms Generally Suggest the Desired Attributes
of the Products they are Associated With
A term is suggestive if it necessitates imagination, thought and
perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of the goods.259
Scrutinizing terms such as “Gold Medal”, “Imperial”, “Plus,” “Super”, “Select,” “Deluxe,” “Greatest Show” and “100%”, what
comes to mind is a bit unclear . . . but that is exactly the point. It
takes a little thought to figure out what these terms imply. Perhaps
“Plus” implies that the product has more of some ingredient or that
the product is of a higher quality than the average product. Each
idea is possible yet neither idea is a sure bet.260 “Select” seems to
258. Id.
259. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir.
1976) (quoting Stix Products, Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479,
488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); 20th Century Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust Inc., 747 F.2d 81, 87
(2d Cir. 1984); LONG, supra note 49, at 49.
260. See Estee Lauder, 108 F.3d at 1509.
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imply high quality. Rightfully, this is what most people would
think when they see “Select” as a mark. What kind of high quality
is a different story. What is good for the goose may not be good
for the gander. Again, it is the perception of the consumer that is
all important. To one consumer, “Deluxe” may be interpreted as
“this product” contains more ingredients than other such products.
To another consumer, “Deluxe” may be associated with higher
quality ingredients or service. One consumer may associate
“100%” with powerful ingredients or effects while another may interpret the same term to mean a certain purity level exists. With a
suggestive term, as opposed to a descriptive term, the producer of
the product is allowing more freedom for the consumer to perceive
the product in her own way. With a descriptive term, the product
name is more likely to tell the potential customer what the product
is all about, therefore, leave the customer with little to imagine.
Laudatory terms, says professor McCarthy, are meant to imply
high quality and to impart an intangible expectation about the
product.261 This explanation seems to point in the “suggestive” direction. However, professor McCarthy then states that “[s]elflaudatory or ‘puffing’ marks are regarded as a condensed form of
describing the character or quality of the goods and that they can
describe some intangible facet of a product.”262 It is posited that
professor McCarthy’s view that a laudatory term can describe
some intangible facet of a product is misplaced. It is put forth that
laudatory terms can only suggest these aspects of goods or services.
McCarthy’s definition appears to be at odds with
Callmann’s definition because Callmann’s “qualities” need to be
indicated in “natural and ordinary language” so that the consumer
can understand the significance of the mark.263 Once the qualities
of a product have been condensed into a vague laudatory term to
describe them, some amount of imagination is required on the part
of the consumer to decipher the appropriate, if there is one, meaning of the term. If this task is done correctly, it is somewhat time
consuming and often inaccurate. Callmann’s definition seems to
261. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 11:17.
262. Id.; see also Burmel Handkerchief Corp. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., 127 F.2d
318 (C.C.P.A. 1942).
263. See CALLMANN, supra note 212, § 18.05.
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imply that qualities are tangible in his analysis and this is why they
can be explained by simple language.264 Because it is championed
that laudatory terms cannot properly describe a product or describe
an “intangible facet” of a product, McCarthy’s definition appears
flawed, and for that reason, it is believed that Callmann’s definition is more accurate and broader than McCarthy’s.
Furthermore, I have yet to see a definition of “suggestive” that
states a substantial amount of imagination is required on the part
of the consumer.265 Only some imagination appears necessary—a
low threshold to surmount. A definition of “suggest” will
strengthen the argument: to bring before a person’s mind indirectly
or to call something up in the mind through association or natural
connection of ideas.266 This definition does an admirable job of
capturing what laudatory terms are designed to do. These terms
are vague terms that try to aid or perhaps confuse the consumer in
thinking about a product a certain way. The maker of “Coppertone” tanning products clearly wished to convey the idea that the
product will help yield the skin a healthy glow. The manufacturer
of “Kickers” is well are that this term will conjure up images of
shoes. If one owns an “Accuride” drawer slide mechanism, one
should expect that the product will perform the same way each
time it travels along its path.
C. The Laudatory Term Case-Law Has Been Inconsistent
Many of the cases mentioned throughout this paper can be critiqued because they have often mischaracterized the laudatory
marks as being descriptive. The first case mentioned in Part II,
Beadleston,267 contained a clear analysis of the purposes of trademark law,268 However, the court erroneously stated that “Impe-

264. See id.
265. See Estee Lauder Inc. v. The Gap, Inc, 108 F.3d 1503, 1509 (2d Cir. 1997);
Gruner + Jahr USA Publ’g v. Meredith Corp., 991 F.2d 1072, 1076 (2d Cir. 1993).
266. THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1314 (rev. ed. 1984).
267. Beadleston & Woerz v. Cooke Brewing Co., 74 F. 229 (7th Cir. 1896).
268. See id. at 230-231. The court discussed consumer confusion, good faith on the
part of the defendant, and trademarks as tools that set one producer’s goods apart from
those of others. Id.
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rial” was descriptive of the beer.269 The court fell into this trap because the plaintiff manufactured beers of different qualities. Nonetheless, the fact the plaintiff manufactured different grades of
beers, does not add very much to the descriptive quality of the beer
that was put in this particular can. “Imperial”, it is admitted, can
suggest the relative quality of the beer compared to other beers—
this is a matter of taste of course, but the plaintiff is not registering
the trademarks for three of its beers at the same time. Though the
context of a term is studied when deciding registration, it is doubtful that any comparison between beers is taken into account when
determining the registerability of the term. There may be perquisites associated with a Seventh Circuit Judge position but taste
tests probably are not among them. Consequently, “Imperial” says
very little about the qualities of the beer. Likewise, the Hiram
Walker court used the term “descriptive” when discussing “Imperial”.270 By stating that “Imperial” meant high quality, the court
reasoned how the proponent of the mark wished the purchasing
public to reason. However, until “imperialness” can be measured,
the phrase is vague and merely suggestive. As previously stated,
“Imperial” describes nothing, it only implies high quality.
Next, when the Board analyzed “America’s Favorite Popcorn”
and “America’s Best Popcorn”, it stated the terms were laudatory
and descriptive of the popcorn, which made the phrase informational.271 This last statement is incorrect in all but the laudatory
label. The Board was, though, accurate in determining that, because no secondary meaning existed with respect to the popcorn
product, refusal of registration was proper.272 Ironically, if it was
possible to determine whether this was America’s favorite popcorn, and if that were answered in the affirmative, then perhaps the
term would be descriptive and not entitled to registration—a penalty for making a superior snack item.
Furthermore, “Smackin’ Good” is not descriptive, but rather
suggestive. The Board was incorrect in labeling the term descrip269. See id. at 231.
270. See Hiram Walker, 79 F.2d at 837-38.
271. See In re Wileswood, Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. 400, 404 (T.T.A.B. 1978). Because,
the popcorn was sold only in a few stores, the phrase seems ridiculous.
272. See id. at 404.
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tive in In re National Tea Co.273 Obviously, no one gets smacked
when tasting the tea. Perhaps the tea has a crisp taste, not unlike a
crisp smack across the face, if such a comparison can be made. In
addition, the “goodness” of the product is advertised even though
this characteristic, if it is one, is not measurable. Likewise, “Selecta” is suggestive and not descriptive, but the Board incorrectly
determined that the term was descriptive.274 “Select” may imply
that the product or its ingredients are chosen from a plethora of
choices. It may also imply that the product is relatively better than
other products on the market, whether from other producers or
even the producer of the “Select” brand.
The In re Occidental Petroleum Board was correct in stating
that “Super Iron” was suggestive of a large quantity of iron, but
was remiss in not analyzing the secondary meaning issue.275 After
correctly, but quickly, deciding the descriptive/suggestive issue,
the Board apparently found it easy to conclude that the mark was
worthy of protection—simply because the phrase was suggestive.
Perhaps the Board decided too easily that registration was proper.
Labeling “Super” suggestive was also the proper way to proceed in
determining whether or not to allow registration for the term “Super Slush”.276 However, as in Occidental Petroleum, the Board
quickly decided that registration was appropriate and was careless
in omitting a discussion of secondary meaning.
With the Platinum Home Mortgage decision, it is apparent that
the court erred in labeling “Platinum” descriptive of the plaintiff’s
services. According to the liberal definition of “descriptive” given
above, this term clearly does not fall within its realm. On the contrary, the term suggests excellence or high quality, or some other
special feature that the vendor possesses. Thus the court erred
when it noted that this term could be “truthfully applied to a whole
range of goods and services.”277 There is nothing truthful about
this term as it relates to mortgages. Platinum and mortgages have
273. 166 U.S.P.Q. 288 (T.T.A.B. 1970).
274. See In re San Miguel Corporation, 229 U.S.P.Q. 617 (T.T.A.B. 1986).
275. See In re Occidental Petroleum, 167 U.S.P.Q. 128 (T.T.A.B. 1970).
276. See In re Ralston Purina, 191 U.S.P.Q. 237, 238 (T.T.A.B. 1976).
277. See Platinum Home Mortgage Corp. v. Platinum Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 97 C
5293, 1997 WL 567909, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 5, 1997), aff’d 149 F.3d 722.
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nothing to do with each other. Loosely using terminology such as
“truthful,” is dangerous for a court’s thinking because it confuses
what should be suggestive terms with descriptive ones, with the resulting change in analysis. Having said this, the term Platinum is a
not a poor choice for the name of a business because it seems just
as arbitrary or suggestive as it does descriptive. It therefore should
have been protected from another firm in the same business using
the same name because customer confusion would likely result.
The user of the name “Platinum” should not expect this name to be
protected against firms using the name outside the mortgage industry because customer confusion would be unlikely.
Fortunately, some courts have understood the dilemma when
analyzing laudatory terms.278 Both the Pabst Brewing and France
Milling cases seem to be close to the championed theory in their
analysis’. Both cases implied that the marks at issue, “Blue Ribbon” and “Gold Medal” respectively, were indicative or suggestive
of quality and only worthy of protection if consumers would be
confused as to the source of the product.279 Neither court claimed
that the term at issue was descriptive.280 This is accurate because
the two terms suggest high quality and nothing more. The plaintiff
in Pabst, never earned a blue ribbon as far as we can tell, and the
plaintiff in France Milling, though garnering a Gold Medal during
the Louisiana Purchase Exposition at St. Louis in 1904, could not
claim that its pancake and buckwheat possessed some “goldmedal” quality; it could only claim through the term that its flour
was liked by many, and perhaps, enjoyed more than other flour
produced by its competition.
Similarly, when the Hughes court held the term “Ideal” was not
descriptive,281 it was correct in its analysis. In addition, the court
then noted that there was secondary meaning associated with the
term “Ideal”—a “descriptive” analysis.282 Rightly, the court realized that because “Ideal” described no aspect of the hairbrush the
278. See supra Part II.
279. See Pabst Brewing Co. v. Decatur Brewing Co., 284 F. 110, 112-13 (7th Cir.
1922); France Milling Co. v. Washburn-Crosby Co., 7 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1925).
280. See Pabst, 284 F. at 112-13; France Milling 7 F.2d at 306.
281. See Hughes v. Alfred H. Smith Co., 209 F. 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1913).
282. See id. at 38-39.
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term was commonplace enough to be utilized by others.283 Unless
“Ideal” was so ingrained in consumers’ minds, it was not worthy of
protection, despite its “suggestive” nature.284
Likewise, the Duvernoy court mentioned that the term “Consistently Superior” was laudatory but did not mention whether it was
descriptive or suggestive.285 The court however, looked for evidence of a secondary meaning because the mark was weak.286 This
was the correct approach because, again, trademark law should not
give firms an incentive to use weak marks for products that the
firms wish protected. By not mentioning the “suggestive” or “descriptive” sections of the trademark spectrum, the court avoided
blatantly linking suggestive terms with a secondary meaning
analysis, an analysis that would seem misguided because traditionally, only descriptive terms are put to the secondary meaning hurdle. This judicial strategy is crafty, even if unintentional. Yet, the
analysis in this case was smart and effective because it provided no
incentive for the firm to use a vague self-laudatory name. Similarly, the court’s analysis in Supreme Wine is worthy of respect because the court first noted that the term “Supreme” was to call attention to the superiority of the product and then stated that to
protect this weak mark, secondary meaning was necessary.287
Once more, the court, perhaps wisely, avoided the use of “suggestive” and “descriptive” and focused instead upon the inherent
weakness of the mark in separating the goods of the plaintiff from
the goods of others.288 Furthermore, on point was the Board’s
analysis of the term “The Premium Grade Malathion” in In re
American Cynamid Co.289 The Board stated that the phrase was
“laudatory, if not, a descriptive designation” and capable of acquiring secondary meaning.290 The Board seemed to realize that laudatory terms are not descriptive of the product they are paired up
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
1962).
288.
289.
290.

See id. at 39.
See id.
See Duvernoy, 212 F.2d at 204.
Id.
See Supreme Wine Co. v. American Distilling Co., 310 F.2d 888, 889 (2d Cir.
See id.
176 U.S.P.Q. 350 (T.T.A.B. 1973).
See id. at 351.
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with. “Premium Grade” is not a technical term in the industry and
therefore, the phrase is suggestive of high quality. Another example of a wise approach to the problem is the Valmor case.291 The
First Circuit stated correctly that “Valmor” was suggestive of the
skin care products of the complainant.292 Immediately after finding the term to be suggestive, the court elaborated “[m]ore importantly, though, even if under some circumstances self-laudatory
trademarks should not be registered or protected . . . the district
court here found that . . . advertising over forty-five years has . . .
established a close connection between the trademark name and its
products . . . .”293 Wisely, the court did not dwell on the word,
whether suggestive or descriptive, linked to the product, but realized the term was vague, looked for secondary meaning, analyzed
customer confusion, and concluded that the plaintiff’s rights in the
name were being infringed.294 More likely than not, this case
posed less of a dilemma because the plaintiff’s company was incorporated under the name “Valmor”, and the term at issue was a
somewhat inventive combination of two suggestive terms, “value”
and “more.”
In discussing combination terms, it should be noted that the
combination term in Plus Products295 must have greatly challenged
the Board, because its reasoning was intensely convoluted. By
correctly stating that “Plus” was suggestive and then re-analyzing
the term after the addition of “pH”, the Board was using an additional term, “pH”, to help distinguish “pH Plus” from “Plus,” the
marks of the proponent and opposer respectively. First, it seems
odd that the court assumed “pH” was “obviously descriptive”
when one can disagree. The term “pH” is a measure of acidity, but
it is not a specific measurement and describes nothing. The term
suggests some sort of chemical compound but nothing more. The
health care products at issue have an acidity, but so does ice cream,
so letting consumers know that the product has an acidity discloses
little. The term “pH” seems to suggest that the product manufac-

291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

See Valmor Prods. Co. v. Standard Prods. Corp., 464 F.2d 200 (1st Cir. 1972).
See id. at 201-02.
Id. at 202.
See id.
Plus Prods. v. Redken Labs, Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q. 111 (T.T.A.B. 1978).
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turer is concerned about the acidity and a certain level of acidity is
more desirable than other levels, but this all falls under the suggestive umbrella.296 Second, the Board appeared to err by using a
likelihood of confusion analysis rather than a secondary meaning
examination to conclude that “pH Plus” was not primarily descriptive of the applicant’s products.297 Of course, a likelihood of confusion analysis would be appropriate in deciding whether or not to
protect the mark, but generally, likelihood of confusion is not
mixed in with a discussion of whether the mark is primarily descriptive of a product. The Board did not use a secondary meaning
analysis because it concluded “Plus” was suggestive of ingredients
in the products. However, by labeling the term suggestive and relying on advertising levels, the Board appeared to follow the path
recommended below, and arrived at a satisfactory conclusion.298 If
this seems confusing, it is because it is confusing.
Returning to Estee Lauder,299 the Second Circuit was correct in
concluding “100%” was suggestive. Interestingly, the court pronounced that laudatory terms were generally deemed suggestive.300
Though we have seen other cases have agree with this proposition,
it is contrary to McCarthy’s position that laudatory terms, on the
whole are descriptive.301 The court’s position seems to be the correct one. However, before the praise for the court goes unabated,
the Estee Lauder court held that “100%” was protectable simply
because it was a suggestive term.302 This is the long-standing notion, but one which this section of the Note preaches against.
Here, it is urged that empty terms such as “100%”, when “100%”
is used vaguely, despite being suggestive, should require secondary
meaning before being protected. The reasons why will be discussed below.

296. Applicant disclaimed “pH” as a measure of acidity or alkalinity. See id. at 117.
297. See id. at 117-18.
298. It should be noted that the opposer could also use “pH” in describing its products if those products could be so described. See id. at 118. This appears curious because
the Board, though stating “pH” is descriptive (which is doubted here), was vague when
explaining how this term could describe any product.
299. See Estee Lauder Inc. v. The Gap, Inc, 108 F.3d 1503 (2d Cir. 1997).
300. See id. at 1509.
301. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 11:17.
302. See id. at 1510.
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D. For the Treatment of Laudatory Terms to Match the Goals
of Trademark Law, A Slightly Different Analysis is
Required
A pattern seems to have developed among some of the cases
discussed. Those courts that eschewed the descriptive/suggestive
dichotomy, such as Duvernoy and Supreme Wine, relied on a secondary meaning analysis. The In re Occidental Petroleum decision, attempting to fit the term into the dichotomy, chose to label
the term “Super Iron” suggestive, ignored the secondary meaning
analysis, because, it is well understood that suggestive terms do not
require secondary meaning to be registerable. By ignoring the dichotomy, it appears that some courts are realizing that laudatory
terms do not fit neatly into the current framework. By not relying
on the trademark spectrum, and instead using common sense, a
path can be followed that often will lead to correct decisions being
made in the laudatory term framework. This is not to imply that
the trademark spectrum is outdated or of no use in deciding when
words and phrases are protectible. For the great many cases, the
spectrum is adequate for this purpose. Nevertheless, for words and
phrases that are clearly laudatory, such as “Plus” and “Super”, the
spectrum seems deficient because a strict following of the dichotomy will more likely lead to the granting of protection, because the
word is, if one is intellectually honest, suggestive, and no secondary meaning analysis is undertaken. Protection would be more
persuasive if the term was more creative—perhaps a clearly fanciful or arbitrary term or certainly even a clearly non-laudatory suggestive term, and there are many that exist. The ingenuity would
be sufficient enough to persuade this author that the term is worthy
of protection against those to attempt to dilute its effectiveness by
utilizing the same or a similar term.
From the preceding discussion, it should be clear that this argument champions the position that before these laudatory/suggestive terms are worthy of protection, secondary meaning
should be found to exist—a high hurdle to leap. Counsel to companies will be abetted in their quest to have their clients use more
arbitrary and fanciful terms if a substantial hurdle, lack of trademark protection, is put in the way by the courts. Realizing that it is
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not the goal of trademark law to influence firms in naming their
products, this argument does take the position that it is right to reward firms for using a mark that will gain protection and erroneous
to reward firms that intend to use weak and vague marks to label
their goods and services. Laudatory terms are not necessary for
firms to sell products. Those firms that would be dissatisfied with
the ideas presented herein can still use truly descriptive terms to
name their wares. Nonetheless, it is smart law to require some
showing that consumers link the laudatory term with a product before the word or phrase can be protected. Without this requirement, companies can use cryptic laudatory terms and leave the
consumer guessing what is meant by “Super” or “Plus” and be rewarded by having these terms protected. Because these terms cannot be defined, a product can have less iron than all of its competitors’ products yet be labeled “Super Iron.”
An arbitrary name will not give the consumer more information about a product than a laudatory term, but it is less likely to be
misleading because arbitrary or fanciful terms, on the whole, do
not “brag”. Also, firms competing with the company using the
laudatory name may have a better product than the “laudatory”
firm, yet if the firm with the inferior product can easily protect its
mark, it will be encouraged to use the laudatory term on its goods
or services, and possibly mislead consumers. Again, protection of
consumers is arguably the pivotal goal of trademark law and this
argument should further that goal in a small way. Trademark law
does not wish to reward companies for misidentifying their goods
or using chicanery in any way.303
Though the Lanham Act has been amended often in the past,
the most recent major amendments coming in the form of the
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988,304 alterations to the Lanham
Act would not fix the issue herein. The Act does not talk of the
distinctiveness spectrum and yet the courts, on the whole, do an
admirable job with trademark law issues. Certainly, laudatory
terms cause many problems for the system, but attempting to spell
303. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1052.
304. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1128 (1994)). The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 contained relatively few changes. See id.
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out what laudatory terms are and the distinctions among them,
would only befuddle the problem. The beauty of the Lanham Act
is the flexibility it gives those that wish to use a trademark to distinguish their products.305 As a matter of fact, the only section of
the Act which hits on our issue is section 1052(e), which states that
terms which are merely descriptive are not registerable.306 Therefore, it is plain that the Act takes a somewhat laissez-faire approach in its view on trademarks, and service marks, and any tinkering with this policy should be done carefully and sparingly.
There is no need to go that route here.
CONCLUSION
The Lanham Act does not define what a laudatory term is or
how it should be protected. Yet, many businesses prefer to use
these terms because they tend to signal to consumers that the product or service is of good quality and perhaps, better quality than the
products it competes with. Because the Lanham Act does not mention laudatory terms, and even if it did, it could not do so adequately because the term is so elusive, the judiciary has been all
over the map. The courts that have realized that laudatory terms
do not specifically describe anything about the product, but rather

305. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1052 states:
No trade-mark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from
the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its nature unless it—
(a) Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons living or
dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or
disrepute;
...
(d) Consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in
the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in
the United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used in
connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive . . .
(e) Consists of a mark which (1) when used on or in connection with the goods
of the applicant is merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them, (2)
when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is primarily geographically descriptive of them.
Id.
306. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1052(e).
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suggest some quality about the product, are the courts that are on
the right track. In addition, the requirement that a laudatory term
should have a secondary meaning associated with it before it can
be protected under the Lanham Act should encourage firms to use
these terms sparingly. By limiting the use of these terms and encouraging ones that are closer to arbitrary on the distinctiveness
spectrum, the courts can champion the general goals of trademark
law: (1) to protect firms that have spent capital developing trademarks from the free-riding of other firms off of this effort, and (2)
to protect consumers from purchasing a good or service that is not
what was expected. Laudatory terms do not fit very neatly into the
current trademark framework, but with care, common sense, and a
desire to fulfill the goals of the Lanham Act, they can be adequately dealt with by the judicial system.

